China’s spy bases in Cuba could play a key role in the Taiwan war

China’s secret spy bases in Cuba mark a new front in Beijing’s global intelligence game by targeting America’s southeast coast.

This month, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a report saying China is likely operating multiple spy facilities in Cuba, based on satellite imagery and open-source information.

CSIS points out that these facilities are strategically located to monitor sensitive communications and activities along the southeast coast of the United States, where numerous military bases and space centers are located.

The report highlights four active sites in Cuba where electronic surveillance operations may be conducted: Bejucal, El Salao, Wajay and Calabazar. The largest is near Bejucal, known for its Cold War history.

The report indicates that the El Salao site near Santiago de Cuba is under construction and will apparently house a large circular array antenna (CDAA) for improved air and maritime situational awareness.

The CSIS report notes that the existence of these facilities underscores China’s ambitions to expand its global intelligence-gathering capabilities and provide Beijing with a significant window into intelligence work in the region.

It also sheds light on the political and strategic motivations behind China’s presence in Cuba, including China’s support for one of the world’s few remaining communist party governments and potential access to military facilities.

The CSIS report suggests that even limited access to these SIGINT capabilities would significantly enhance China’s ability to monitor and communicate with its space assets and intercept data from U.S. satellites.

It says China’s spy facilities in Cuba are a cause for concern among U.S. policymakers and regional partners because China’s gradual expansion in Cuba could have long-term strategic implications for the United States.

China is aware of Cuba’s strategic importance due to its location in the Caribbean. Its position allows the country to control maritime access to the United States and effectively block it without actually enforcing a blockade.

China’s increased presence in Cuba could also persuade Caribbean states that recognize Taiwan to abandon their position. These advantages make Cuba a valuable card in China’s hands should a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan arise.

On the military front, Robert Ellis, in a 2023 article for the Peruvian Army’s Center for Strategic Studies, explains that China would likely station military personnel in Latin America before hostilities to assist in intelligence gathering and special operations.

Ellis adds that these personnel could be preparing to disrupt key U.S. facilities or routes such as the Panama Canal, monitor U.S. military operations from the Caribbean, or even plan attacks on the American homeland.

Ellis notes that China could also use intelligence or special operations forces to provoke crises in the region that could affect the United States, such as disrupting supply chains or creating a food crisis. He mentions that these forces could instigate economic or political destabilization in U.S. partner countries by using economically dependent, anti-American partners to support their efforts.

He also says China may seek support from non-European, anti-American partners such as Russia and Iran, as well as partners in the region such as Venezuela and Nicaragua. Ellis adds that China could carry out economic or other acts of sabotage to distract or indirectly influence the US, which would be facilitated by the significant presence of Chinese companies in the region.

Beyond Cuba, China is pursuing a multi-pronged strategy to expand its influence in Latin America, encompassing economic, political, information and cyber elements.

In a June 2023 Brookings Institution commentary, Jessica Brandt says China has used its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its engagement in more than 20 Latin American countries, gaining influence that it can exert geopolitically in the future.

However, Brandt points out that China’s economic pressure through tactics such as boycotts, import restrictions and export quotas could promote the dependence of Latin American countries and undermine good governance, potentially contributing to illegal migration.

In addition, Brandt said, China is presenting itself as a supporter of Latin American societies in their struggle against the hypocritical, excessive democracies led by the United States.

She also says China’s information activities in Latin America promote a narrative that portrays democracy as helpless and hypocritical while extolling the benefits of its autocratic system of government. She points out, for example, that China highlights the US’s hypocrisy in promoting human rights and mistreating migrants.

Brandt also says China has equipped at least nine Latin American countries with surveillance systems, with the technology potentially undermining human rights and contributing to illegal migration.

These developments could challenge the long-standing US dominance over Latin America as defined by the Monroe Doctrine, which states that any interference by foreign powers in the political affairs of the Americas constitutes a potentially hostile act against the United States.

In a June 2023 article for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Daniel Vrablic notes that long-standing US dominance in Latin America may be coming to an end. Vrablic points out that China has accelerated its trade with the region, expected to exceed $700 billion by 2035, creating a gateway for greater political and military influence.

According to Vrablic, Russia is increasingly trying to end US partnerships with Latin American countries and play a role as a leading arms supplier, while Iran is also trying to reduce the US military presence in the region. He argues that the US should develop a strategy to deter China and Russia, its near-peer adversaries, from further advances in Latin America.

He points out that these revisionist powers are creating spheres of influence that undermine the US-led, rules-based international order. Vrablic argues that this has exacerbated US security problems, such as the flow of illegal drugs across the US-Mexico border, organised crime gangs undermining the rule of law by bribing politicians and law enforcement, and a significant decline in democracy in Latin America and the US.

According to Vrablić, the US does not have the advantage of geographical distance from its equal opponents in Latin America. Therefore, it is imperative for the US to rethink its approach and make new diplomatic and security policy offers.

In this sense, Anthony Constantini mentions in a February 2023 article for The National Interest (TNI) that a “Monroe Doctrine Plus” should focus attention on US interests and advocate pragmatism rather than focusing on an ideological approach.

Constantini also says that the Monroe Doctrine Plus should leverage old and existing alliances and avoid twisting U.S. national interests to serve old alliances. He stresses that Europe could opt for a neutral position in a Taiwan conflict, Eurasia could fall under Sino-Russian hegemony, and the U.S. could have difficulty containing Chinese influence in Latin America if the U.S. fails to meet its commitments in Europe and East Asia.