Massachusetts Court of Appeals rules on land value and land use planning

The Massachusetts Court of Appeals recently considered the diminution in value of a property as a basis for filing a zoning appeal. Pobeda RT II, ​​LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Watertown, The court confirmed that the value of an individual property is not, in and of itself, a protected interest that can serve as the basis for appealing a zoning decision. Rather, the property value must be tied to another interest protected by the zoning ordinance in question, such as the preservation of views, light or space.

winner is an appeal of a special permit to build a three-story, 88,572-square-foot research facility in an industrial park in Watertown. The plaintiff, Pobeda RT II, ​​LLC (Pobeda), owns adjacent property in a residential area and was a party presumed to be disadvantaged. Pobeda claimed that the research facility would “substantially diminish” the value of its residential property. The project proponent, Cresset/WS Venture LLC (Cresset), moved for summary judgment and attempted to rebut Pobeda’s presumed standing with expert affidavits on some of the claims of disadvantage (e.g., noise, air quality, light), but also arguing that the property value under these circumstances was not an interest protected by Watertown’s zoning code. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Cresset, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

winner is following a well-trodden path. On appeal, Pobeda argued that the Superior Court erred in finding that Watertown’s zoning ordinance did not protect property values ​​under the circumstances. This argument contradicts previous appellate decisions that show that diminished property values not do not confer standing unless it concerns “recognizable interests protected by the applicable land use regulations.” Kenner v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham459 Mass. 115, 123 (2011). The court held that a general reference to “preservation of land and buildings value” in the purposes section of a building code does not make preservation of property value a protected interest in all cases. It does not place individual economic interests above community interests, such as protecting public health and safety. If Pobeda had successfully linked its alleged decrease in property value to a real threat to public health and safety, a complaint might have been substantiated. Instead, the court found that Pobeda had only raised speculative concerns and stigmas associated with biolabs.

The Court of Appeals’ analysis does not break new ground. But a brief footnote raises the specter of bigger things to come. In footnote five, the Court emphasized that it “leaves for another day the question of whether a plaintiff can ever succeed in proving that a zoning code protects the value of individual properties.” If the reduction in property value must always be linked to some other interest, there is no reason why it should ever be a basis for a lawsuit. Rather, it is better viewed as a concrete way to prove other intangible damages. For example, if a zoning code protects against deprivation of light and air, a plaintiff could argue that a tall, bulky building approved by special permit deprives him of light and air and that this deprivation can be quantified by the diminished property value. But it seems that the plaintiff is taking on more than is necessary. Perhaps the depreciation of a property as a reason for action is almost pointless and is just waiting for the coup de grace, and the court has only just indicated that this will come soon.