“Hamas is an idea” Post-war lessons from Baghdad to Jerusalem

Military officers rarely contradict their civilian superiors in public during a war. This makes the interview with Israel Defense Forces spokesman Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari on Israel’s Channel 13 news all the more remarkable.

In a direct challenge to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who insists on the destruction of Hamas, Hagari said: “Hamas is an idea, Hamas is a party. It is rooted in the hearts of the people – whoever thinks we can destroy Hamas is wrong.”

When asked what should happen to the post-war Gaza Strip, he warned: “If we don’t give Gaza something different, at the end of the day we will get Hamas.”

Hagari’s comments reflect a lesson that U.S. forces learned the hard way in Iraq: “In counterinsurgency, you cannot win by killing.”

Soldiers know the limits of military power better than the civilians they send to war.

In 2003, the United States and its allies invaded Iraq expecting quick success. They planned to overthrow Saddam Hussein, install a democratic government, and then withdraw soon after.

Because the Bush administration did not want to become entangled in a protracted counterinsurgency campaign, the Pentagon did not develop an adequate post-conflict stabilization plan.

As Iraq descended into chaos, the United States had no choice but to establish the Coalition Transitional Administration under the leadership of L. Paul Bremer III. Bremer almost immediately disbanded the army without pay and disqualified former members of the Baath Party from all office.

These decisions deprived Iraq of the civil servants it needed to govern and drove angry, armed former soldiers into the ranks of a growing insurgent group.

Foreign fighters poured into the country, exacerbating insecurity. It took the US and its allies three years to defeat the insurgents. ISIS rose from the ashes, leaving behind instability that continues to this day.

Conditions in Gaza are far worse than in post-invasion Iraq.

According to a study by Boston University, 70 percent of residential buildings were destroyed. 37,000 people were killed and 1.7 million became internally displaced.

The health system in Gaza has collapsed. Garbage collection has virtually come to a standstill. Since there is no police in the area, the distribution of humanitarian aid is threatened by lawlessness.

Poor sanitation, heat and lack of drinking water are contributing to disease, especially among children. The United Nations warns that by mid-July, more than a million people will be at risk of starvation.

The UN estimates that rebuilding Gaza will take 16 years and cost $40 billion. And someone has to govern and administer the territory. The Israeli military does not want that job any more than the US military wanted it in Iraq. Occupying a densely populated, highly urbanized area is a labor-intensive task for which the soldiers are neither trained nor equipped.

With a war against Hezbollah looming in the north – and with it the danger of a larger conflagration – the Israeli armed forces cannot afford to tie down troops in the Gaza Strip.

Shortly after the invasion began, Netanyahu said Israel did not want to occupy the country but needed to station a “credible force” there to maintain security for the foreseeable future.

He did not explain how this would work in detail.

At the beginning of the war, the Biden administration brought up the idea of ​​an international peacekeeping force. The history of UN peacekeeping forces does not bode well for the success of such a mission.

Lightly armed multinational troops can be useful in separating warring parties that have agreed to a ceasefire, as has been the case on the island of Cyprus for 60 years. But the experiences in Somalia and Bosnia make it clear that peacekeepers cannot end a civil war, fight an insurgency or defend a territory against armed opposition.

The UN interim force stationed in Lebanon since 1978 has not been able to prevent recurring conflicts between Israel and Hezbollah.

For several months, the proposal for an international force was moot because no country volunteered to send it. In May, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Morocco said they would consider sending troops, but only if the United States recognized a Palestinian state. This demand is a no-go for the current Israeli government.

In January, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant proposed a four-point plan for post-war Gaza: Israeli forces would provide security, a coalition of the United States and moderate Arab states would be responsible for reconstruction, control of civil affairs would be transferred to local Palestinians, and no Jewish settlements would be built in the Gaza Strip.

The far right, led by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, rejected the plan. The Israeli right also rejects any role for the Palestinian Authority, which currently administers the Palestinian-controlled areas in the West Bank.

The hardliners have their own plan, which the US has categorically condemned: the Palestinians should be expelled and replaced by Israeli settlers. Israeli Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir said the Israeli government should encourage the “voluntary emigration” of Palestinians from Gaza.

If the behavior of ultra-Zionist settlers in the West Bank is anything to go by, “voluntary emigration” would mean making life so unbearable that residents have no choice but to leave the country. And even if Palestinians wanted to emigrate, there would be nowhere for them to go. The surrounding Arab countries do not want and cannot afford any more refugees.

Without a peace plan, an occupation by the Israeli forces is very likely, even though the military hates the idea. But as the 18-year Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon shows, this is not a permanent solution. Sooner or later, some kind of civilian government must be established.

Israel is also running out of time. Netanyahu has announced that the “intensive phase” of the war in Gaza is coming to an end. As the heavy fighting subsides, the question “What happens next?” is becoming increasingly important.

In his response, Netanyahu would do well to consider the wisdom of Union General William Tecumseh Sherman: “The legitimate aim of war is a more perfect peace.”

In the case of Gaza, such peace can only be achieved through the establishment of a government that enjoys the support of its Palestinian citizens.

Tom Mockaitis is a professor of history at DePaul University and author of  “Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency.”