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Iran’s covert war: How Iraqi Shiites cooperate with the IRGC

Iran’s covert war: How Iraqi Shiites cooperate with the IRGC

This month, three IRGC-backed Shiite militant groups in Iraq declared their willingness to send troops to Lebanon to participate in a possible war between Hezbollah and Israel.

At the same time, the commander of the ground forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the groups known as the Resistance Front would not remain silent in the face of a possible war.

All signs therefore indicate that Tehran is sending the necessary resources to Lebanon via these Iraqi militant groups, using Syria as a land bridge.

The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee (IRCC), also known as Tansiqiya, is a coalition of Iraqi militias backed by Iran. It is part of Tehran’s broader strategy to exert influence in the region and counter the presence of the United States and its allies.

These groups include Harakat al-Nujaba (HaN), Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS).

But how do these Iran-backed groups operate and what strategic position has Iran given them to challenge Israel’s security?

Map showing the main border crossing between Iraq and Syria, which Iran uses as a transit route for arms deliveries to Hezbollah.

Harakat Al-Nujaba: A strategic and integral arm of the IRGC’s extraterritorial unit, the Quds Force

Harakat al-Nujaba (HaN) is currently the best known group within the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee (IRCC).

According to a source close to Hashd al-Shaabi, an umbrella organization of various Shiite militias in Iraq, the group was founded under the direct supervision of Qasem Soleimani, the former commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

HaN initially began as part of Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) in 2004, but became an independent organization in 2013 due to disagreements between Akram al-Kaabi, the leader of HaN, and Qais al-Khazali, the leader of AAH. Despite their separation, both groups maintain good relations and continue to work together due to their common goals.

The group’s initial budget of $10 million was provided by Lebanon’s Hezbollah, which also helped organize the group.

Soleimani reportedly preferred that the National Alliance focus on military activities rather than engaging in politics.

Financially supported by the IRGC, HaN pays its fighters significantly more than other groups, with salaries of around $1,400 per month – while other Iraqi fighters received a monthly salary of $300 to $400. The extensive financial support has helped HaN increase its personnel strength, and the group now has over 10,000 members.

HaN is closely intertwined with the IRGC and essentially operates as an extension of the Quds Force rather than just a proxy group.

In particular, it played a significant role in the Syrian civil war, especially in the Battle of Aleppo.

The group also appears to have a special relationship with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, a relationship facilitated by Mohsen Qomi, the deputy international affairs officer in Khamenei’s office, who serves as their main liaison.

The group’s media activities are supported by the Union of Islamic Radio and Television, which has an extensive organizational presence in Iran. The Persian section of HaN’s website and social media accounts are significantly more active and better maintained compared to the Arabic section. HaN operates 12 offices in major Iranian cities, including Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad. A significant facility is an eight-story building in Jannatabad, Tehran.

Iraqi Kataib al-Hezbollah during the first years of its founding.

The Han forces are trained in special military facilities in Iran, including the Pazooki Barracks in Tehran and the Imam Sadiq Brigade 83 base in Qom. These sites are important training centers where Han fighters are trained under the supervision of the IRGC, improving their military capabilities and integration into Iranian strategic operations.

HaN’s military activities are carried out under the supervision of the IRGC, and IRGC special forces monitor the launch of its missiles at their targets. Hamid Fazeli, former head of the Iranian Space Agency and head of Unit 340 of the IRGC’s Quds Force, leads the monitoring operations.

A source close to Hashd al-Shaabi told Iran International that the Quds Force has set up a weapons factory for HaN in Iraq and a significant portion of these weapons are being delivered to Lebanon. These are the shipments that Israel often tries to prevent as they enter Syria and are transported west toward Lebanon.

Akram al-Kaabi, Secretary General of HaN, is reportedly a long-time resident of Iran and travels to Iraq with a Misaq card and an Iranian passport. The Misaq card, issued to prominent figures of the resistance front, facilitates smooth transit through airports and highways.

According to the same source, the 47-year-old has three wives and nine children who live in two of his houses in Jannatabad and in the Olympic Village in Tehran.

He is known to frequent Iranian political circles and has met with many key figures, from former President Ebrahim Raisi to Ahmad Alamolhoda, the Friday preacher of Mashhad, and Mohsen Rezaei, the secretary of the Supreme Economic Coordination Council.

Today, the group consists of four factions. Qasim al-Jabbarin carries out attacks on Erbil airport, while Saraya Ababil specializes in drone operations. As’hab al-Kahf, founded by Hezbollah’s Imad Mughniyeh, focuses on IED attacks against American forces. Saraya Awliya al-Dam attacks US bases in the Persian Gulf and supports Houthi forces in Yemen.

Seven years ago, HaN announced the formation of the Golan Liberation Corps and declared that it was ready to recapture the Golan Heights from Israel at Syria’s request.

Following Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7 last year and the start of the Gaza war, Harakat al-Nujaba attempted to attack Israeli territory. Last November, the group claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on the port of Eilat in Israel.

According to a source close to the IRGC, the organization has also set up an economic commission for HaN. This commission has offices in China and the United Arab Emirates and handles oil sales on behalf of the IRGC. This arrangement allows the IRGC to conduct certain financial transactions through HaN, effectively bypassing official records and maintaining a certain level of financial opacity.

The source also mentioned that HaN passes on revenues from oil sales to the Quds Force, as the IRGC covers all of its expenses, further underscoring the group’s deep integration and dependence on the IRGC.

Kata’ib Hezbollah: From Badr Corps to Iran’s anti-Israel proxy

The second group that has declared its willingness to go to war against Israel is Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH). This powerful Iraqi militant group was founded in 2003 by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

The group initially focused on fighting US forces in Iraq, but later joined the Syrian civil war and fought in support of Bashar al-Assad.

The United States designated KH as a terrorist organization in 2009.

According to a source close to Hashd al-Shaabi, KH’s roots go back to the Badr Corps, a Shiite militia and political party in Iraq whose fighters allied themselves with Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.

Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis founded KH by leveraging family connections within the Badr Corps, eliminating the need for structural support from Hezbollah in Lebanon.

This was the first militia group that Tehran sent to Syria to help Assad suppress street protests.

Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the founder of the group, was killed along with Soleimani in a US airstrike in Iraq on January 3, 2020. He was succeeded by Ahmed al-Hamidawi.

While the Islamic Republic supports KH financially, the group also carries out extensive economic activities.

According to an Iraqi source, the group buys land in Europe, sells oil and has acquired shares in several Iranian refineries. In addition, the group earns around $100 million from exporting chemical fertilizers from Iran to Iraq.

Last February, one of the group’s most prominent leaders, Abu Baqir al-Saadi, was killed in a US drone strike. The group’s leader, Ahmed al-Hamidawi, then fled to Iran along with his three brothers, As’ad, Arqad and Akhlad, where they are reportedly currently located.

It had previously become known that Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis lived with his Iranian wife on Golestan 1st Street in Tehran’s affluent Pasdaran district, which is known for its upscale residential buildings, shopping centers and proximity to the political and military elite.

Since the start of Israel’s war against Hamas on October 7 last year, KH has claimed responsibility for more than 150 attacks on US forces.

Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada: Soleimani’s strategic contractors in Syria

Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) is the smallest of the three groups that have declared their willingness to send troops to Lebanon.

This group announced its existence in 2013 when three of its members were killed in a suburb of Damascus.

The KSS was mainly active in Syria and stated that it had sent 500 fighters to Damascus and Eastern Ghouta.

According to a source close to Hashd al-Shaabi, they worked as contractors with Soleimani in Syria and reportedly received two million dollars to maintain a front and advance five kilometers.

Recently, the KSS has tried to attract more attention by attacking American targets.

The group’s leader, Abu Alaa al-Walai, welcomed the election of Ebrahim Raisi as Iranian president in 2021, saying his “victory” would give new impetus to IRGC-backed militant groups.

The KSS has around 3,000 fighters and is financed by the IRGC’s Quds Force. As part of the Hashd al-Shaabi, however, it also receives payments from the Iraqi government.

The group maintains close ties with the Lebanese Hezbollah and benefits from its financial and intelligence support.

Last year, the US designated the KSS as a terrorist organization.