Final blow to Chinese “neutrality” in Ukraine war – POLITICO

Meanwhile, Beijing has also embraced the concept of “indivisible security,” which says countries should not strengthen their security at the expense of others – a doctrine Moscow has promoted for decades and a critique of NATO’s activities. Before the invasion, China had supported the concept in joint statements with Russia. But since then, it has been part of the Global Security Initiative – a cornerstone of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vision for international relations – suggesting it will play a more prominent role in Chinese foreign policy.

The two also share a disdain for Western sanctions – including those against Russia. Chinese politicians vehemently oppose American “illegal unilateral sanctions” and say they will not comply with them. And Xi has not only passively resisted efforts to isolate Russia and offered the country an economic lifeline, but also shown that he is willing to bear both reputational losses and economic costs to help his neighbor.

Since 2022, China’s leaders have struggled with a severe economic downturn, the sudden and inexplicable firing of two ministers, and growing Western opposition to their global ambitions. The war has only compounded these challenges, as China’s relations with Europe have been soured by Beijing’s support for Moscow. And although China has shied away from openly violating Western sanctions, several Chinese companies have recently been restricted from trading with Russian partners.

But Xi seems willing to make this sacrifice. In fact, the West’s ties with Russia seem to be only getting stronger, while the West has increased its demands on China. Trade and the arms industry have increased significantly, and the Russian population also seems to be more positive about China.

The longer China maintains its pro-Russian stance, the harder it will be to reverse all this. Chinese companies have already adapted their business operations to accommodate the growing trade relations with Russia. Over time, it will become more difficult and expensive to reverse this structural change. Moreover, Xi’s support for Putin personal and well-respectedAnd since China’s pro-Russian policies do not enjoy widespread support among Chinese intellectuals, a policy reversal could be seen as a concession to its critics.

After his meeting with Xi in April, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that the two heads of state and government had agreed, “coordinate intensively” about holding peace conferences regarding Ukraine. And he made it clear that he thinks: “China’s word carries weight in Russia.”

It is true that a mediator does not need to be completely impartial to be successful. With decisive influence over one or both parties to a conflict, he can persuade them to compromise that would otherwise be impossible. But for such efforts to succeed, the mediator must be willing to exert pressure on the dependent parties in ways that can significantly strain his relations with them. So far, Xi has shown no sign of being willing to do so – and the chances of that appear to be diminishing.

European politicians would do well to maintain dialogue with China and continue to demand that Xi use his influence. But unless China does so, there is a risk that the invasion will be legitimized by allowing Beijing an important role in the peace process.