Book review: The Lost Decade – The US Turn to Asia and the Rise of China

In 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a “shift in emphasis to Asia” in an article in the US magazine Foreign Policy. President Barack Obama reiterated this in a speech to the Australian Parliament on November 17, 2011. For the first time in US history, US foreign policy should be Asia first, not Europe first.

But in their recent book, Lost Decade: The US Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power, Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine argue that the pivot was announced but never actually happened – despite the compelling arguments for the pivot, namely ensuring a strategic balance with China’s growing power and harnessing Asia’s economic dynamism. And while the US did not pivot, China did move closer to its Asian neighbors during this period – militarily, economically, and through its diplomacy. In fact, China is now the most important trading partner of most Asian countries, making them more exposed to potential economic coercion.

Blackwill of the US Council on Foreign Relations and Fontaine of the Center for a New American Security conclude that the US was in a much weaker position in Asia in 2021 than it was in 2011, the “lost decade” (which encompasses much of the Obama and Trump presidencies). In fact, they argue that the failure to turn things around was one of the three biggest US foreign policy mistakes since the end of World War II. The other mistakes were President Lyndon Johnson’s 1965 decision to escalate the war in Vietnam and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Moreover, the United States showed little resolve during this period by doing nothing when China built artificial islands in the South China Sea and then militarized them, despite solemn promises by the Chinese president to the American president. The power of American deterrence was further weakened when two presidents drew red lines in the Middle East and failed to act when they were crossed.

The authors explain the three pillars of the pivot concept. First, it was envisaged that an end to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would free up military resources for Asia. But the wars were not ended. And the US defense budget was cut by $500 billion through domestic budgetary processes, with the result that US military resources in Asia declined over the course of the lost decade.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was the main economic pillar. However, delays in negotiations led to it being caught up in the 2016 presidential election campaign and distanced by both candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. The latter withdrew the US from the TPP after his inauguration. The TPP debacle was arguably the pivot’s biggest failure. Finally, US diplomacy in the region was inconsistent: Secretary of State Clinton was very active, while her successor John Kerry was more engaged in the Middle East and Russia. But perhaps most importantly, there was no catalytic event that would have mobilized the country for such a change in strategy. Nor did the pivot benefit from the president’s discipline and determination to ensure its implementation.

The authors also tell the story of the mismanagement of an idea that, ironically, had bipartisan support. There was no serious “interagency” process in the U.S. government to prepare Clinton’s article. This meant that large parts of the U.S. government did not understand the pivot or could not answer inevitable questions. Nor were America’s friends, partners, and allies affected by the pivot consulted or warned. Europeans in particular did not react positively to the possibility that the U.S. might turn away from them and toward Asia, while many Asian countries feared that the U.S. would pressure them into choosing between China and the U.S. In the flood of reactions, the pivot was renamed “rebalance.” While rebalance was then used in official communications, the catchier term “pivot” remained widely used.

The tragic irony of the pivot was the reaction of China, the pivot’s main target. China launched a rhetorical campaign against the pivot, knowing full well that the US was doing very little to implement it. And China seized the opportunity for an astonishing buildup of its military power, shifting the military balance of power around the South China Sea and Taiwan.

The authors argue that the United States consistently underestimated the challenge posed by China until the late 2010s. It was only with President Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy that the idea that China could become a “responsible actor” in the world order was jettisoned and China was labeled a “strategic competitor” and a “revisionist power.” But Trump did little more than pivot; on the contrary, he insulted key allies.

The Biden administration’s efforts to initiate a new “partial pivot” through a series of initiatives are very impressive. The AUKUS partnership between the US, UK and Australia is important and is likely to see a growing number of participants. The Quad meeting has been elevated to the level of a summit. And relations with several Asian countries have been strengthened, such as the first ASEAN summit in Washington, the strengthening of the US alliance with Japan, and partnerships such as US/Japan/Korea and US/Japan/Philippines. In short, Biden recognizes that the US can only compete with China with the help of its allies, partners and friends. But the Biden administration’s attention has been hijacked by events such as the wars in Ukraine and Gaza.

The authors make a very convincing case for a new pivot to ensure that China is either unable or unwilling to overturn the rules-based international order. But they do not inspire great optimism. They recommend increased military spending and a focus on Asia, even though the opposite is true. They call for a US trade policy for Asia, even though the US has not joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. A fundamental challenge for US policymakers is that the American public is very skeptical of the country’s international role and leadership.

People like this reader who lived through the “lost decade” will find it a pleasure to read this well-documented and logically constructed account of the events of that period. Of course, there are commentators who will quibble over the details of the story. But the weakened position of the United States in Asia is a reality that needs to be understood, especially as we prepare for the unpredictable consequences of the upcoming US presidential election. For these reasons, this book is a “must-read” for anyone interested in international relations.

Editor’s Note: This review by Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaines Lost decade: The US turn to Asia and the rise of China (Oxford University, 2024) was first published by the Australian Institute of International Affairs on July 12, 2024 and is reprinted with permission.