To end the war in Ukraine, we need something that everyone can hate

The war in Ukraine seems difficult to end and terrible to watch. It is a bloody mystery: why have Ukraine and Russia been fighting and tearing each other apart for so long? Why can’t they sign a peace treaty and end the bloodshed?

In a recent book, I examined why some wars are so hard to end. I found that a fundamental problem that keeps wars going is the deep distrust among the warring parties that the opponent will respect a peace agreement that ends the war. Even if a potential peace agreement that ends the war contains acceptable terms, if the warring party believes its opponent will break the agreement, it will not accept it, and the war will continue.

This deep lack of trust has been the breeding ground for many long and bloody wars. In 1940, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill repelled German peace feelers because he knew the Nazis could not be trusted. More recently, the Syrian civil war has dragged on for more than a decade because rebel groups have no confidence in the word of the Assad government. The shadow of what could happen after A peace agreement has an impact on whether the parties accept a peace agreement.

Of course, there is a sea of ​​mistrust between Moscow and Kyiv. Ukraine deeply distrusts Russia because Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014, support for the uprising in Donbass and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 violate the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia pledged to respect Ukraine’s borders and sovereignty.

Worse, some possible peace terms, such as Russia’s permanent control of the economically and militarily important Donbass region, would tip the balance of power in Russia’s favor. Ukraine in particular would be unlikely to accept such an agreement because it would increase Russia’s incentives to break the agreement later. This was one of the reasons why Churchill opposed negotiations, fearing that Nazi leader Adolf Hitler would demand British colonies and naval disarmament in a peace agreement, leaving Britain helpless to resist any German demands for Britain’s complete surrender.

Russia distrusts Ukraine and the West, as its official statements show. It claims that NATO’s eastward expansion after the Cold War violated a commitment to respect Russia’s sphere of interests. “Thus, an absolutely unacceptable threat was steadily created for us right on our borders,” Russian President Vladimir Putin said in May 2022.

So what options remain? How can the two sides find a way out without Russia tearing Ukraine apart and without abandoning the unrealistic dream of Putin being ousted by a pro-peace faction in Russia?

History shows what might work and what might not. In conflicts between smaller parties, international peacekeepers can help reduce mistrust. But given Russia’s size and its veto power in the UN Security Council, peacekeepers will not be part of the solution. Russia cynically ignored observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe when they were sent to eastern Ukraine in the late 2010s.

The “Korea Option” could also pose a political challenge. Although the United States still deeply distrusted North Korea and China in 1953, Washington agreed to a ceasefire that effectively ended the Korean War because South Korea’s security still rested on three strong pillars: a US-South Korean alliance, the long-term stationing of a significant number of US troops on the peninsula, and US nuclear deterrence.

The Korea option for Ukraine would pose political challenges, at least in the short term. At the upcoming NATO summit in July, the alliance is likely to lay out the terms of a “bridge” to Ukraine’s accession, expanding on its soft commitment to eventual membership made in 2008. But the political consequences of Ukraine’s actual NATO accession seem uncertain. The country’s NATO membership would require unanimous approval from allies, and one could imagine Turkey, Hungary, or isolationists in the U.S. Senate blocking the move. Indeed, it seems that an obstacle to a potential path to ending the war has emerged in the spring of 2022, in part because Washington signaled that it was unwilling to consider Ukraine’s condition for a NATO-like security guarantee from the United States.

But there is a possible way out. Imagine that instead of agreeing to NATO membership after the war, the West helped Ukraine to become strong enough on its own to repel future Russian attacks, through military aid and training, and by helping it improve its defense industry. A recent RAND report described a variant of this approach as the “porcupine strategy,” which would make Ukraine such a prickly target that Russia would leave it alone.

This strategy would allow NATO members to stay out of a future war between Russia and Ukraine and would make it politically acceptable to the West. For Ukraine, it would be a path to long-term security that does not rely on the hope of benevolent Russian intentions. And if that promise were coupled with the significant incentive of a Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territory captured after the 2022 invasion, Ukraine could be brought on board.

For Russia, the main benefit of this option would be a de facto, if not de jure, promise not to admit Ukraine into NATO. Russia might be more likely to believe an informal non-membership commitment if it received assurances that Turkey and Hungary would oppose Ukrainian membership. Such a promise by Hungary is easy to imagine, given its recent efforts to prevent the European Union from even supplying arms to Ukraine.

Such a non-membership concession could also end the war in another way: It would be a fig leaf for Putin. Recent research shows that Putin recognized as early as March 2022 that the war was a mistake. Today, he may remain open to finding a way to end the war, especially given that Russia has already lost about 150,000 troops and could run out of tanks and combat vehicles by the summer of 2025. Without a fig leaf concession, however, Putin risks being forced out of office by disillusioned nationalist elites or military officers. Other dictators have lost power this way, too, such as when Pakistan’s strongman leader Yahya Khan was overthrown after his country was vivisected in the 1971 Bangladesh War. Fig leaves can help buy the support of pro-war military figures for peace deals. In 1945, the United States’ agreement to leave the emperor alone was crucial to the Japanese military’s acceptance of an otherwise unconditional surrender.

Some might suggest pursuing the porcupine strategy unilaterally and giving aid to Ukraine without bothering to get Russia’s consent to a peace deal. But the past year has shown that even if Ukraine is well armed, it will be difficult to regain territory through offensive operations. A peace deal of the right kind, to which Russia agrees, is the best way for Ukraine to regain important territory.

Critics would argue that this deal has something for everyone to hate: Ukraine gives up its dream of NATO membership and possibly accepts de facto Russian occupation of Crimea, the West agrees to long-term military and economic aid to Ukraine, and Russia withdraws from Ukrainian territories captured after 2022. But in politics and economics, the parties are within the realm of a doable deal if everyone finds this deal painful.

Such a deal is becoming increasingly likely because the war is in a bloody stalemate for all sides. As the staggering costs of the war continue to rise, all parties will be increasingly willing to make a politically painful deal to end the war. Moreover, it is difficult for Ukraine and Russia to imagine a military victory in the near future, especially if Donald Trump does not win the U.S. presidential election in November and then withdraws U.S. support for Ukraine.

To achieve peace, Ukraine and its Western partners must find a way to overcome mistrust. It will not be easy. But to prevent tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of deaths, they must try.

Dan Reiter is Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of Political Science at Emory University and author of the award-winning book How wars end (Princeton, 2009).

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Image: Handout photo shows Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky being briefed on fighting along the front lines by 92nd Separate Assault Brigade Commander Pavlo Fedosenko in Kharkiv region, Ukraine, May 16, 2024. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the northeastern city of Kharkiv on Thursday to boost morale and reinforce troops in the region where Russian forces are trying to push their new offensive beyond the border areas. “The direction remains extremely difficult, we are reinforcing our units,” Zelensky said after a meeting in Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, with his top commander and senior military leaders. Photo by Ukrainian Presidency via ABACAPRESS.COM