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Review of Covert – The Psychology of War and Peace: Language of Peacemaking

Review of Covert – The Psychology of War and Peace: Language of Peacemaking

Can tried and tested methods of consultation and mediation, such as those used to resolve unhappy married couples, be applied to dealing with disputes between neighbours and arch-enemies, such as India and Pakistan have become? And more importantly, do the context, place and language of the discussion matter?

During Narendra Modi’s visit to Lahore in December 2015, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif asked Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar why he preferred to speak English. Jaishankar reportedly replied that it was because Sharif was a “foreign head of state” to him, suggesting a strict formality and distance in tone. This and other anecdotes are quoted in a new book: Covert: The Psychology of War and Peacein which psychologist Neil Aggarwal speaks to former R&AW chief AS Dulat and former ISI chief Asad Durrani. It is a continuation of the 2018 Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI and the Illusion of Peace.

Journalist Aditya Sinha conducted the interview and discussed in detail how language, religion, family ties and personal aspects of the interlocutors affect their ability to communicate with each other.

The then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (left) receives the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the Wagah border in 1999. | Photo credit: AP

Cultural Links

However, the question of whether a shared local language and personal ties work requires further analysis. Both Prime Minister Modi and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee used Urdu in their conversations with Nawaz Sharif, forged personal ties, and publicly embraced him during their respective visits to Lahore in 1999 and 2015. In contrast, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, a Pakistani-born Punjabi, rarely spoke anything other than English in meetings with Pakistani leaders, nor did he visit Pakistan throughout his tenure. Singh’s government, however, enjoyed a longer period of uninterrupted formal relations with Pakistan (2004–2008 and 2010–2014) than Vajpayee (1999–2001 and 2003–2004) and Modi (2015–2016 and 2018–2019).

As a continuation Hidden is completely different from Spy Chroniclesas the earlier book examined events and dialogues between Dulat and Durrani while they were in positions of power and for years afterward, when they were “in the know” of the official India-Pakistan dialogue process. The latest version is more concerned with the “Track II” initiatives that the two men have been involved in for two decades, examining how informal dialogue works and what might provide a breakthrough to elevate talks to the Track I level. The format of both volumes is question-and-answer transcripts of hours of moderated, unedited conversations. This is tedious at times and should have been reworded; the editors may even consider a third volume that brings the content of the first two books into a more reader-friendly format.

Dulat and Durrani are as cordial as ever, but the narrative in Hidden seems far less anecdotal and newsworthy – perhaps both are playing it safe, given their experiences with the previous book. The publication of Spy Chroniclesthe first collaboration of its kind between intelligence chiefs of two enemy nations, had caused uproar in both Delhi and Islamabad. Dulat faced a barrage of criticism from officials in Delhi and, according to his memoirs, A life in the shadows was published, the Modi government changed its pension rules and banned officers of the IB, R&AW and 24 security services from writing books without official permission. In Islamabad, the Pakistan Army ordered a commission of inquiry into Durrani’s comments in the book and put him on the Exit Control List, preventing him from leaving the country for a period of time.

Kashmiris shout slogans during a protest against the abrogation of Article 370 on the outskirts of Srinagar. | Photo credit: AP

Push for engagement

The conversations between Dulat and Durrani show that the refusal to talk has ideological and emotional reasons, while the need for engagement is more rational and “realpolitik” in nature. In a separate clinical article titled “How psychoanalytic theory and Track II diplomacy can inform each other: A dialogue with the former heads of Indian and Pakistani intelligence services,” Dr. Aggarwal concludes that one must learn to continue conversations “even when intense emotional impacts such as anger threaten to interrupt the dialogue.” The “ground rules” of dialogue are simple: the two interlocutors must be polite to each other, listen to each other and not interrupt, speak freely, and show compassion. Having exhausted so many avenues of engagement without achieving much, perhaps what the two countries need is not more heads of state, diplomats, and generals, but counseling and therapy.

Pakistani soldiers patrol the area where they reportedly shot down Indian aircraft after India launched airstrikes in Jaba, near Balakot, Pakistan, in 2019. | Photo credit: AP

Little optimism

Hidden is also less hopeful about India-Pakistan relations than it was in the first decade. While the last decade may seem bleak, especially given the major ruptures surrounding the 2016 Uri terror attack, the 2019 Pulwama attack and the Balakot attacks, as well as the move to weaken Article 370 and reorganise Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019, there has also been some quiet progress during this period.

Then-Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan addresses the gathering during the inauguration ceremony of Kartarpur Corridor at Gurdwara Darbar Sahib in Kartarpur, Pakistan in 2019. | Image credit: PTI

There were the two years of backroom talks between National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Pakistan’s NSA appointee Nasser Khan Janjua, the negotiation of the 2021 Line of Control ceasefire through the NSA military channel that ensured India could move some of its battalions to deal with the LAC crisis with China, the management of a potentially devastating missile misfire from India into Pakistan, and the creation and success of the Kartarpur Corridor.

With the exception of the final chapter, “An Honest Assessment of Future Peacemaking,” the book avoids excessive optimism.

Hidden is nevertheless an important work for diplomatic students and practitioners on both sides of the border, as it conveys a new and previously overlooked aspect of the India-Pakistan conflict – the psychoanalytic aspect. In a world moving towards greater regional engagement, where India and Pakistan have so much more to gain in terms of economic, trade, environmental, tourism and social cooperation, but so much more to lose by spending much-needed resources on hostilities, it is this aspect that most needs to be explored.

Covert: The Psychology of War and Peace; AS Dulat, Asad Durrani, Neil K. Aggarwal, HarperCollins, ₹699.

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