Four key factors for the development of the Ukraine war in 2025

The past six months have been a low point for Ukraine as it seeks to thwart the Russian military’s efforts to ruin and subjugate it. Beginning with the Ukrainian president’s admission last December that the 2023 counteroffensive had failed, Ukraine has also struggled with an ammunition shortage due to months of debate in the U.S. Congress, a significant shortage of front-line personnel due in part to the delay of Ukraine’s mobilization legislation, and a renewed Russian airstrike that is destroying Ukraine’s power-generating capacity and targeting Ukrainian combat units with dozens of glide bombs daily.

Europe has slowly but surely awakened from its strategic slumber.

Yet the Ukrainian military has been reluctant to give up ground, maintaining and repositioning its forces while inflicting massive losses on the attacking Russians. Figures released by the Ukrainian government and confirmed by Western intelligence officials show that the last six months have seen the highest daily Russian casualty figures since February 2022. The brutal tally of the last six months is that Russia has suffered over 180,000 casualties for the gain of just over 510 square kilometers. That’s about a tenth the size of Kangaroo Island in South Australia.

Russia has refrained from large-scale attacks and instead carried out multiple attacks to gradually capture small parts of Ukrainian territory. Putin intends to implement this strategy indefinitely, although it remains to be seen whether the Russian people feel the same way as Putin. With this in mind, Ukrainian planners will have begun to think about future offensive operations to liberate more parts of their territory.

These events of the past six months will have a fundamental impact on how Ukraine, Russia and NATO plan their strategy for the rest of the summer, the winter and the inevitable spring and summer campaigns of 2025. However, there will be several other influences on the course of the war in Ukraine in the coming year.

The first problem will be Europe’s ability to support the war. Europe has slowly but surely awakened from its strategic slumber of the past three decades. Panicked by a combination of Trump’s coercive measures and the revelation of the Russian threat, European defense budgets have begun to rise. At the same time, investment in defense production, including equipment and ammunition, is being increased, as is the capacity to support equipment in Ukrainian service. If the current expansion of European defense spending continues, it should be able to meet a larger share of Ukraine’s military needs by 2025.

The brutal result of the last six months is this: for the gain of just over 510 square kilometers, Russia suffered more than 180,000 casualties.

A second influence on the course of the war will be the development of a Ukrainian theory of victory. While the Ukrainian defensive strategy worked well in the first year of the war, the Russian adjustment of its military strategy, bolstered by the mobilization of Russian industry and personnel, has created the need for Ukraine to rethink its theory of victory for this war. What exactly does victory look like for the Ukrainians, and how might they achieve it? This victory will likely have several components, including military, economic, diplomatic, and informational, and will likely also have to involve the development of a new, more effective offensive military doctrine. The development of this Ukrainian theory of victory should be coordinated with NATO and will require increased military and financial assistance to Ukraine.

A third factor will be whether events outside Central Europe distract key U.S. decision-makers and other supporters of Ukraine, or divert critical resources to other theaters of war. The most obvious is a war on Israel’s northern border. This would likely require more ammunition from Israeli forces than its operations in Gaza, and would put significant pressure on even the increased production of American and European weapons manufacturers. Outside Israel, the U.S. and its Asian allies must also be on guard and prepared for an opportunistic China to take military action against Taiwan.

One final influence will be the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in November. Putin is hoping for a victory for the Republican candidate. Recent polls from the Pew Research Center show a divide between Republican and Democratic voters in terms of support for Ukraine: 49 percent of Republicans believe the U.S. is giving Ukraine too much aid, compared to 16 percent of Democrats. A Republican victory in the presidential election, as well as in the Senate and House elections, could benefit Russia. But that should not be taken for granted. If a newly elected President Donald Trump cannot “end the war within 24 hours,” he may well turn against Vladimir Putin.

Ukraine and Russia are already planning their winter operations for 2024 and thinking about their offensive operations for 2025. There are a number of known variables that will influence this strategic thinking and planning. In addition, in a rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, strategic surprises can affect the course of the war.

Russia will continue to implement its strategy of subjecting Ukraine and its people to a death by a thousand cuts. And Ukraine, as it has done throughout the war, will continue to adapt and seek new ways not only to destroy as many Russian forces as possible, but also to develop new strategic methods to convince Putin that his Ukraine gamble will never pay off.