How Israel’s war on Gaza is testing relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan

While pro-Palestinian demonstrations around the world, especially on American university campuses, are the focus of global attention, another major boycott campaign is brewing in Turkey, but this one is directed against Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel.

Baku’s controversial oil exports to Israel have prompted Turkish activists to stage protests outside the Istanbul office of the Azerbaijani State Oil Company (SOCAR) over the past six months.

The protesters accuse Baku of supporting the Israeli war machine in the brutal war against Gaza. They demand that Turkey stop oil deliveries to Israel via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. The pipeline runs from Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkish Mediterranean ports, from where the oil is shipped all over the world, including to Haifa.

Without Azerbaijani oil, Israel’s war economy would likely find it extremely difficult to function, as Baku currently supplies 40% of the country’s oil needs, which have more than doubled since the beginning of 2024.

The protests reached their peak on May 31, when the activist group “Thousand Youth for Palestine” broke open the main entrance of the SOCAR building and threw red paint on the walls. The protesters carried banners with slogans such as “Two states, one betrayal,” a reference to the famous “One nation, two states” motto that characterizes Turkish-Azerbaijani relations.

On June 20, another wave of protests erupted at SOCAR’s office when activists waving Palestinian flags threw stones at the building’s glass windows. While Azerbaijani officials and pro-government media had previously remained silent on these protests in an attempt to downplay Palestine as a factor in their relations with Turkey, the May 31 incident provoked strong official and public reactions.

Pro-government media accused “Iranian circles” of “trying to damage Azerbaijan’s image in Turkey” – a scapegoat strategy common in such situations. SOCAR, for its part, denied direct oil sales to Tel Aviv, claiming that the sales were made through trading companies that were neither monitored nor controlled by suppliers such as SOCAR.

Tense Turkish-Israeli relations and Baku’s dilemma

While Israel is becoming increasingly isolated internationally, Baku’s official position is increasingly diverging from that of Turkey. Despite years of efforts by Baku, the reconciliation process between Israel and Turkey has become precarious due to the Gaza war.

After months of tense talks, Ankara broke off diplomatic relations and announced a complete trade embargo against Israel until the Gaza conflict is resolved. In contrast, Azerbaijan has increased its oil exports to Israel and refrained from making even token criticism of Israel, in stark contrast to Ankara’s position.

Israeli President Isaac Herzog plans to attend COP29 in Baku in November, and in April 2024, energy ministers of both countries discussed expanding energy cooperation at a meeting in Dubai. This not only undermines the “one nation, two states” narrative domestically, but also raises doubts about the nature of the “iron alliance” between Turkey and Azerbaijan.

However, Armenia’s surprise recognition of Palestine presents both challenges and opportunities for Baku. There are already calls in Israel to increase military support to Azerbaijan in response to Armenia’s move. Israel may now consider selling Azerbaijan modern loitering weapons systems, which it has been hesitant to export due to American concerns.

But Baku’s persistent efforts to portray the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as an Islamic issue within the framework of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), while distancing itself from the ongoing bloodshed in Gaza in the face of Armenia’s actions, expose the hypocrisy of its foreign policy and damage its reputation among Muslim-majority countries.

Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan has not sent humanitarian aid to Gaza, although the country – despite being a close partner of Russia – has sent strategic support such as generators and transformers to Ukraine in addition to conventional aid.

Baku is certainly not happy with this situation, as it puts the country in a difficult position and makes it difficult to manage the strained relationship between its main ally and strategic partner. It is worth recalling that during the dispute between Turkey and Greece over gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2020, Azerbaijani President Aliyev assured Ankara of full support, while Israel moved closer to Athens.

Given these promises, Erdogan is likely counting on strong support from Aliyev, especially after Turkey’s crucial support for Azerbaijan’s war effort in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020. For now, however, Ankara seems to want Baku to be more vocal on Palestine rather than publicly weaken diplomatic relations or cut off trade ties with Israel.

Baku, however, is cautious about condemning Tel Aviv while breaking its silence on Palestine. At his recent meeting with Egypt’s Sisi on June 8, Aliyev called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and an end to the Gaza war without mentioning Israel. He specifically noted that Egypt’s initiatives “should be taken into account,” and hinted that Azerbaijan will maintain its profitable trade and diplomatic relations with Israel, just as Egypt does.

After a meeting between Azerbaijani and Turkish politicians on June 10, the Turkish side reported that Erdogan discussed “the need for international pressure on Israel to combat these crimes.” This detail was not mentioned in Azerbaijan’s official summary, which instead praised the “successful development of brotherly, friendly and allied relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey.”

The tensions in Turkish-Israeli relations are also evident in intelligence matters rather than in policymaking, which takes place more behind the scenes. When relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv became particularly toxic in 2012, Turkish intelligence services leaked details of Mossad spying in Iran to their Iranian counterparts, reportedly based in part on their knowledge of the Israeli presence in Azerbaijan.

Reorientation of the Iran-Turkey agreement

The Israeli threat has certainly led to a geopolitical alignment between Tehran and Ankara over Gaza and Lebanon, which is not a pleasant scenario for Baku. The shared distrust of Iran has been an important factor since the establishment of relations between Azerbaijan and Israel. Turkey was already not entirely happy with Azerbaijan’s growing hostility towards Iran during the 2022-23 crisis over the so-called “Zangezur Corridor”.

At the time, Baku agreed to establish an alternative route to Turkey through Iranian territory instead of Armenia, a plan first announced by Erdogan. Now that Turkey is moving closer to Tehran, Baku may reassess its Iran policy, particularly with regard to the ethnic map vis-à-vis Iran’s sizeable Azerbaijani minority.

Nevertheless, Turkey’s influence over Azerbaijan is greater than its influence over Israel, which it can use given the delay in the ceasefire in Gaza. First and foremost, Azerbaijan’s major projects, such as the so-called Middle Corridor, are closely linked to Turkey, which is Baku’s gateway to the West.

In addition, Turkey is Baku’s most important and only ally in the South Caucasus to counterbalance Russia’s influence.

Most importantly, Ankara’s independent normalization of relations with Armenia could thwart Azerbaijan’s attempts to diplomatically cement its military victory to its advantage. Under these circumstances, Baku is hoping for a quick ceasefire in Gaza to avoid further pressure from its key ally.

Rovshan Mammadli is a Baku-based journalist and independent analyst. He holds a BA in Israel and Middle East Studies and an MA in International Policy Studies. His main areas of focus are Azerbaijani foreign policy, Middle East politics, and peace and security in the South Caucasus.

Follow him on X: @MammadliRovshan