Protecting Ukrainian democracy during the war

On May 30, 2024, the five-year term of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy ended. Seven months earlier, in October 2023, the date for regular elections to the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, had passed. Zelenskyy and the Rada deputies will remain in office as long as the war continues: the suspension of regular elections in wartime is prescribed in the Ukrainian constitution. Despite the social consensus that the continuation of the war makes elections politically, financially and logistically impossible, there is great concern about the fragile state of the democratic values ​​and freedoms that Ukraine is fighting to defend.

War and the danger of democratic regression

War changes many things, including the way political power works. It requires high levels of social cohesion, quick and efficient decision-making, and the mobilization of the country’s resources for the war effort. But states of emergency tend to strengthen the executive branch and push democracy into dangerous waters. And while some democratic institutions, such as elections, may necessarily be suspended, democracy is not reducible to elections: it also means securing an open, pluralistic society in which its various interest groups have a voice. But Zelensky’s government has come under criticism for violating political checks and balances and civil liberties that Ukrainians are accustomed to and want to defend.

In its 2023 review of Ukraine’s human rights record, the U.S. State Department joined domestic critics in expressing concern about the United TV Marathon, a joint initiative of pro-government channels that produce a nonstop program and deny airtime to opposition channels. In addition, reports of harassment, illegal surveillance, and targeted front-line mobilization against dissident journalists are mounting.

Regular consultations between the President’s Office, the Government and the Rada were suspended immediately after the Russian invasion, as the country’s survival was at stake, and Zelenskyy devoted all his energies to mobilising international support for Ukraine. Yet two and a half years later, the executive and the Rada have still not restored a minimum level of effective communication and mutual accountability. Ukraine’s much-vaunted decentralisation reform, introduced before the war to transfer power and budgetary resources to local communities, has also suffered a setback, largely due to the pressure exerted by the war and the associated diversion of resources to the central government. Yet Ukraine needs a strong and competent local government to continue rebuilding devastated communities, maintain public services during the war and ensure effective and efficient post-war reconstruction.

Corruption and bribery remain, and are particularly egregious given the battlefield losses and societal toll. While public awareness of this problem is partly due to notable successes against corrupt actors, who are continually tracked down and held to account, corruption is primarily a function of flawed and unaccountable institutions, not individual wrongdoers. Public perceptions that Ukrainian institutions lack transparency have not been strengthened by allegations that Zelensky relies on a small inner circle of confidants for decision-making and has made questionable personnel decisions. In short, the president’s office has become increasingly isolated from the people it governs as it consolidates its power. The longer the war drags on, the more the line between the necessity of war and the abuse of power becomes blurred.

Ukraine’s democratic backsliding threatens to undermine the country’s wartime cohesion. Ukrainians are known for defending their freedoms, as evidenced by the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. Moreover, today’s Ukrainian society is home to hundreds of thousands of veterans who bled for their country’s freedom and do not like to sit under irresponsible leaders. Without elections, the problem of political accountability becomes even more acute. But any anti-government protest or uprising – indeed any sign of internal discord and division – would be ruthlessly exploited by Russia. The longer Zelensky oversteps his peacetime mandate, the more likely Moscow will reinforce its pet theme of the illegitimacy of the “Kiev regime.” Ukraine’s accession to the European Union (EU) and NATO may also be at risk. Right-wing populist and isolationist forces emerging in Europe and the United States are looking for reasons to cut their support for Ukraine. Corruption is their favourite hobbyhorse.

Making Ukrainian democracy war-proof

Avoiding the illiberal pitfalls will be challenging, but it is possible. Fortunately, neither Ukrainian society as a whole nor Zelensky personally harbor authoritarian tendencies: glorifying the iron fist is simply not part of Ukrainian history or political culture. Ukrainians and their Western partners also have tools. One of them is Ukraine’s vibrant civil society, with its talent for self-organization and an ever-watchful eye on the state. It has gained confidence and strength during the war and is more determined than ever to keep political power in check, whether elections are held or not. Strong investigative media will be crucial in this task.

Another tool is the financial aid provided by Ukraine’s Western partners. While military aid should focus exclusively on the fastest and most effective path to Ukraine’s victory, the $40 billion in budgetary injections that Ukraine needs annually to stay afloat should be accompanied by gentle urging from donors that their aid be accompanied by reform and streamlining of state institutions and processes. Indeed, Ukraine could and should emerge from this war with more efficient and transparent political, economic and defense institutions ready to integrate with its European and NATO partners.

Finally, Ukraine’s EU membership, negotiations for which will begin on 25 June 2024, should not be seen as a reward that Ukraine expects for doing its homework with one hand and fighting the Russians with the other. Accession itself should be an integral part of the reform process. Brussels has extensive experience in integrating members with varying degrees of institutional maturity and political stability. However, Ukraine is the only country that has embarked on this journey in the midst of a war. But if anything, war, with its grim vicissitudes, reveals a nation’s strengths and vulnerabilities, as well as its pitfalls and opportunities. It is a great motivator for positive change, in which Ukrainian civil society will undoubtedly be a powerful stakeholder.

The Russo-Ukrainian war is about more than just Ukraine and its territorial integrity. It is a standoff between liberal modernity and postmodern illiberalism. It is a test of the solidarity, endurance and resilience of the richest and most successful alliance of like-minded states in the world – liberal democracies. It is therefore absolutely crucial that Ukraine wins, and a Ukraine with democratic credentials, not just rescued from this war but forged in its fires.