How Hamas stays in power in the war between Israel and Hamas without giving up
How can it be that Hamas, although it is neither a particularly large nor a strong organization, refuses to submit to pressure from the United States, the world’s greatest power, and two major states in the Middle East, Egypt and Qatar?
Although Hamas is under heavy military pressure from Israel, has suffered numerous casualties and has lost most of its territorial strongholds as well as the Philadelphia Corridor, its lifeline, the tunnel, it remains unwilling to accept proposals that would seem relatively generous given its current situation.
To answer this question, one must delve into the mind of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar – a difficult if not impossible task, as the events of October 7 demonstrated. Although some psychologists would classify his personality as psychotic or narcissistic, there is a rational element in his decisions, even if that rationality is different from ours.
Despite this challenge, there are several explanations for why the mediators have so far failed to persuade or coerce Sinwar. The first explanation is that none of the mediators has sufficient leverage over Hamas.
Of these three options, Qatar appears to have the three most important: it could stop its financial aid to Hamas (which is currently not arriving anyway), freeze the organization’s assets in Qatar, and close Hamas offices in Qatar, which would mean banishing Hamas leaders from the country’s territory.
Qatar has threatened to expel the Hamas leadership from its territory, but this threat has not been carried out so far because Qatar understands that such a move would jeopardise its ability to mediate between Israel and Hamas.
Losing this role would damage Qatar’s regional and international status. Sinwar is not concerned that the living standards of the Hamas leadership could suffer.
Egypt’s influence is even less than that of Qatar. Although Egypt is considered a “big sister” in the Arab world, it has few resources to use as a mediator. It has even lost its last lever – control of the Philadelphia Corridor.
Although the General Intelligence Service, which is responsible for relations with Hamas, offers the organization a kind of “bear hug,” the two have more opposing interests than common interests.
USA plays important mediating role
The importance of the United States as a mediator lies in its ability to provide guarantees against any Israeli violations of the agreement after it is signed. Moreover, President Joe Biden has no direct influence over Hamas. The main and perhaps only indirect influence at his disposal is to put pressure on Qatar, a U.S. ally that hosts the largest American military base in the Middle East and enjoys special status as a non-NATO ally.
But the United States has no interest in harming itself by harming Qatar. In this context, the United Nations may have a stronger influence in the form of sanctions under Article 7 of the UN Charter.
A second explanation is related to the fact that sanctions against uncooperative actors on the international stage are ineffective when the survival of those actors is at stake.
In other words, those in danger of being wiped out will not be deterred by threats from their allies or mediators. Therefore, any proposal that does not include a clear promise to end the war will be rejected, even at the cost of more casualties – which are not a factor for Hamas when considering whether to continue or end the fighting.
Finally, the pressure exerted on Israel by the international community, the military pressure exerted by Hezbollah on the northern border, and the pressure from Israeli society to reach a settlement for the hostages have led Sinwar to conclude that his goals will ultimately be achieved, even if it will take a long time. This policy is associated with risk-taking and confrontation, characteristic of impulsive or extremely courageous leaders.
What are the possibilities?
If this assessment is correct, what can be done? There are three options:
The first option is to simply accept Hamas’ demands. The advantage of this approach is that it will bring about an end to the war and the release of the hostages, and perhaps allow Israel to focus on the northern theatre of war, which in any case requires a more robust policy, whether by diplomatic or military means.
The downside is that Israel will be seen as having failed in its military goals of overthrowing and expelling Hamas, and Hamas’s self-image of having defeated Israel by surviving will be reinforced. In this sense, the war will resemble the Suez War and the Yom Kippur War, which ended in military victories for Israel but diplomatic victories for Nasser and Sadat, respectively.
The second option is to start working seriously on plans for rebuilding Gaza under an alternative leadership – not under an Israeli civil or military administration, but under an internationally legitimate body such as the Palestinian Authority, albeit with a different leadership that enjoys local legitimacy. The return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza with the support of moderate Arab states would pose a real threat to what remains of Hamas rule in Gaza.
This option also includes promoting the normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia, which in turn would be a catalyst for Israel’s further security and economic integration in the region.
The third option is to continue the war until Hamas surrenders unconditionally. However, this goal is probably unattainable as long as Hamas continues to hold hostages.
The war in Gaza is asymmetric: it is a war between a state and a non-state actor, between a large army that uses enormous forces and highly sophisticated weapons and an organization that uses limited (and sometimes primitive) means and guerrilla tactics.
In many ways, it is reminiscent of the Viet Cong war against the United States in Vietnam, and we all know how that ended. Israel must choose a realistic option – that is, a combination of the first and second options described above.
The author teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim – the Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policy.
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