There could be a war between Israel and Hezbollah
![There could be a war between Israel and Hezbollah There could be a war between Israel and Hezbollah](https://www.chicagotribune.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/ctc-l-Lebanon-Israel-Palestinians.jpg?w=1024&h=683)
As the war between Israel and Hamas appears to be entering a new phase of more targeted attacks on Gaza, another war is raging along the Israeli-Lebanese border.
Since the October 7 Hamas attack in southern Israel, the Israeli military and Hezbollah have been involved in deadly clashes in the border region. Israel said it had Thousands of Hezbollah targets throughout Lebanon, killing at least 300 Hezbollah fighters. According to the Israeli military, Hezbollah more than 5,000 rockets, drones and missiles into northern Israel, killing Israeli civilians and soldiers and forcing tens of thousands of Israelis to flee their homes.
The danger of this conflict should not be underestimated. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may at some point come to the conclusion that large-scale military action is necessary to drive Hezbollah out of the country. During a visit to the northern Israeli city of Kiryat Shmona on June 5, Netanyahu said: Netanyahu stressed that security in the north will be restored sooner or later. Plans for a large-scale Israeli operation against Hezbollah have reportedly been approved, meaning that only a political decision by Netanyahu stands in the way of another war in Lebanon.
For months, the exchange of blows between Israel and Hezbollah was limited to 8 to 10 kilometers of the Blue Line, the border between Israel and Lebanon marked by the United Nations. But the scope of hostilities is expanding. It is no longer uncommon for Israeli airstrikes to land deep in the interior of Lebanon. On June 10, Israel carried out its deepest attack in Lebanon to date. Attack on a Hezbollah facility in the Baalbek region. Israel killed Hezbollah field commander Taleb Abdallah the next day, after which Hezbollah fired hundreds of rockets into northern Israel in retaliation. Hezbollah is using increasingly sophisticated weapons to penetrate Israeli air defenses.
Israeli military operations in Lebanon have a long history. In 1978 and 1982, the military carried out operations against the Palestine Liberation Organization and in 1993, 1996 And 2006 against Hezbollah. None of these operations were particularly successful. Israel’s 1982 invasion forced PLO leader Yasser Arafat into Tunisia, but also led to an 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon, which arguably gave rise to Hezbollah. The 1993 and 1996 airstrikes were tactical successes at best. The 2006 war hit Hezbollah hard, restoring deterrence along the border, but the Lebanese group was able to quickly restore its military power thanks to Iranian help.
It is difficult to imagine that another large-scale Israeli invasion of Lebanon could succeed where others have failed. Hezbollah is no longer an insurgent with a limited reach – it is the dominant political faction in Lebanese politics, and its military wing is larger than the official Lebanese army. Hezbollah’s arsenal, complete with up to 200,000 rocketsCombat drones, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, and precision weapons supplied by Iran would all be used in a war with Israel. Israeli cities and towns far beyond the border region would suffer significant damage. Hezbollah’s rockets can hit all of Israel, and the group has enough of them to confuse Israeli air defense systems.
President Joe Biden’s administration is well aware of how destabilizing a war in Lebanon would be. US officials have They reportedly told their Israeli colleagues that a limited war against Hezbollah would likely force Iran, Hezbollah’s main sponsor, to become more involved.
The US has tried to negotiate a deal that would at least de-escalate the situation. Biden’s special envoy Amos Hochstein conducted another round of shuttle diplomacy with Israeli and Lebanese officials last week, but his efforts have so far been unsuccessful. Hezbollah insists that no diplomatic agreement is possible until Israel ends the war in Gaza.
An agreement is in sight, but both sides must abandon maximalism and make room for common sense.
Israel wants Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani River, about 32 kilometers from the Israeli-Lebanese border. However, it is difficult to imagine Hezbollah complying with this demand, as it would force the group to abandon its main support base. However, depending on what Israel offers in return, Hezbollah could potentially withdraw 10-11 kilometers from the Israeli border. This will not satisfy hardliners in Israel, but is better than the current arrangement, which labels northern Israel as a de facto military zone with no civilians.
To make these conditions more palatable to the Israelis, the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon could monitor the withdrawal. In addition, the Lebanese army could be deployed to the areas vacated by Hezbollah to ensure that the militia does not fulfill its obligations.
Israel will not get this concession for free, of course. While no Israeli prime minister would agree to limiting Israel’s ability to defend itself – nor should he – it would allow Israel to stop daily incursions into Lebanese airspace, or at least limit them to an agreed number. Israeli ground forces would have to withdraw from the small swathes of Lebanese territory that they still occupy in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Assuming all of this succeeds – admittedly a tall order – Israel and the Lebanese state could then proceed to negotiate a permanent border.
In the meantime, the Biden administration must be brutally honest with its friends in Israel: Not only would the United States not participate in a war in Lebanon, it would oppose it on principle. Israel must not be under the illusion that the United States would save it if the Israeli government launched a large-scale offensive.
A good enough diplomatic solution – even if it is only a placeholder – is preferable to a war that would cause immense suffering in the region, undermine US policy goals in the Middle East, and drag the US and Iran into a direct conflict that neither wants to have.
Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.
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