India’s multi-alignment policy and its response to the Ukraine war

IIndia’s foreign policy under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is firmly based on the premise that it can better serve the country’s national interests not through military alliances with major powers but by diversifying strategic partnerships with many countries under a policy of multi-alignment strategy. It also enables the country to avoid excessive military commitments and ties arising from a military alliance. Against this backdrop, it has shied away from formally supporting the military objectives of the other QUAD members of the Indo-Pacific alliance and portrayed its Indo-Pacific policy as broad enough to also include Russia and other powers that share the idea and concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific and can contribute to it. India tried to build strategic bilateral relations with both the US and Russia in the post-Cold War era, despite oft-repeated criticism that India is courting the US more and giving its traditional patron, Russia, the cold shoulder. India viewed the Russo-Ukrainian war as an opportunity to demonstrate its friendship with Moscow and maintain its centuries-old strategic ties.

However, the ongoing war on Ukrainian soil contains certain dynamics that require India to play a much more active role than simply reacting to the evolving situation within the framework of a cross-border policy.

According to reports, Russian and Chinese naval forces have begun joint military exercises recently in a port in southern China, despite NATO criticism that Beijing has fueled and strengthened Moscow’s military campaign and war machine in Ukraine. Previously, China had been observed secretly exploiting its strategic partnership with Russia in the Ukrainian theater, even as it had publicly offered the role of peace broker by encouraging the warring parties to end the war. On February 24, 2023, China published a position paper outlining principles for a political solution to the Russia-Ukraine war. In fact, China sought to disguise its important military and financial support to Russia under the guise of its diplomatic accoutrement. Russia, burdened with sanctions from the United States, Europe, and other American allies, and with no partner to explicitly provide it with economic and military support, is increasingly relying on China’s secret support to avert the sanctions regime and secure economic aid. As after every crisis, Russia’s relations with China gained in importance. For example, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, when the country was facing increasing sanctions on several fronts, China was the first country to purchase S-400 surface-to-air missiles, which was later made public. Likewise, the Chinese president chose to visit Russian President Vladimir Putin just days after the latter was implicated in war crimes by the ICC, and both leaders signed a series of agreements that were sparsely reported and not fully made public. The clearly anti-American stance of both powers leads them to cooperate on several fronts, ranging from advanced military technology to natural resources.

The Ukrainian war and India’s expected benefits from a multi-alignment strategy

The policy of multi-alignment strategy allows India to take a cautious path and refrain from increasing criticism of Russia for its aggressive behavior. India believes that this would prevent Russia from drifting towards its traditional adversaries China and Pakistan, which pose a direct threat to Indian interests. Second, India is conscious of the fact that any public criticism of Russia for its invasion of Ukraine would completely alienate the country as a direct belligerent from New Delhi. Third, this policy would prevent India from losing its relationship with a major power that has been a trusted partner due to the crucial and consistent support it has provided to the country in the past, such as through its veto power in the UN Security Council on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir or through military and security support during the height of the Cold War. India still requires continuous supplies of Russian military equipment and technology to operate the Soviet-era weapons and ammunition, apart from increasing dependence on its natural resources. Fourth, New Delhi believes that India’s strategic partnership with the US would not be affected as the Biden administration understands India’s predicament. Nevertheless, India’s stated policy of multi-alignment strategy is a peace strategy cleverly designed to safeguard the country’s national interests without compromising strategic relations with powers that do not pose a direct threat to the country. As long as India wants to maintain a balance in its relations with the US and Russia, all can go well. However, in times of war, perceptions can play a big role. The gap between India’s ambitions and projections as a rising power and its actual role in such situations can be crucial in garnering support in peacetime.

War situations and multiple alignment

The unfolding war scenario in Ukraine demanded a far clearer and more categorical response from New Delhi. Despite robust strategic bilateral relations with Russia, India has failed to exploit the Ukrainian theatre of war on an equal footing with China and has failed to curb Moscow’s ever-increasing rapprochement with China. Nor can its policy of multi-alignment strategy elevate its relations with the US to the level that the latter maintains with its traditional allies. Its policy of distancing itself from public criticism of the Russian position only makes the country appear as an ambivalent power in the eyes of the US and its allies in Europe and other parts of the world. In war situations, the policy of multi-alignment strategy does not pay off as much as a proactive posture or secret maneuvers, as practiced in a sophisticated manner by China or the US’s allies. India’s apparent neutrality cannot stop China from playing a far stronger role with Russia in the Indo-Pacific region and around the Himalayan landscape. While India can be assured of the containment policy of the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific, India’s national interests in the Himalayan region will be particularly vulnerable in the future. India’s ability to pursue its national interests through its declared multi-alliance policy is severely limited. It cannot anger Russia, criticise it publicly for its invasion, nor can it build relations with Russia.

Although the situation has changed since India refrained from criticising the Soviet Union for its military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 during the height of the Cold War when New Delhi viewed Moscow as its only strategic partner, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the post-Cold War and post-Soviet period has not put India in a better position to take a clear position on the issue other than calling for respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, indirectly pointing to the Russian actions and urging a diplomatic solution to the war. The situation in Afghanistan and Ukraine is qualitatively different for India in that in the case of Afghanistan, India’s diplomatic stance was clearly based on its national interest; in the case of Ukraine, it was merely a reaction to a delicate situation. Unlike in the days of the Cold War, India has developed close strategic relations with the US and both countries signed many significant defence agreements when Russia was at war in Ukraine. In the post-Soviet era, India has also diversified its military and strategic relations with many countries. Yet, India’s response to a renewed war situation remains the same, but this time national interests are at stake.

India must play an active role in finding diplomatic solutions to the war, using the platform of the dormant Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and enlisting the support of the global South. India does not need to blame any country for the war, but it can make proactive efforts to signal that it is not just a country with great power ambitions, but also capable of fulfilling the obligations that come with them. Renewing and revitalizing the NAM can be an appropriate response to the situation in Ukraine.

(Photo by 内閣官房内閣広報室, via Wikimedia Commons CC BY 4.0)

Dr. Manoj Kumar Mishra is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, SVM Autonomous College, Odisha, India. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.