India’s diplomacy in the Middle East is once again under pressure from the warring parties in the Arab-Israeli crisis. India’s traditional policy of advocating a two-state solution with East Jerusalem as the capital of an independent and viable Palestinian state remains unchanged. Yet much has changed in the way India reinterprets the meaning and context of its Palestine policy.
After the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7 Indian media And right-wing public opinion had supported by an overwhelming majority the Israeli military response in Gaza. Arab diplomats in New Delhi expressed their unease about the increasingly hostile public opinion towards Palestine.
Beyond the balancing act
The pro-Israel gestures of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party are no secret to Arab diplomats, who knew that a BJP-led government in New Delhi would open a new chapter in relations with Israel that goes beyond the traditional “balancing act.”
The BJP and its ecosystem of support see Israel as a country that has always stood by India in times of crisis with Pakistan. Israel, aware of the conflicts between India and Pakistan, took full advantage of this opportunity and held its Normalization efforts with Pakistan Secret to avoid India’s sensitive public opinion. Those who are aware of Israel’s efforts to normalize relations with Pakistan know that two Muslim nations, Pakistan and Indonesia, remain top priorities for Israel and its Western backers, who are Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia also supports Pakistan-Israel relationsas Pakistan remains its most important traditional ally.
In this context, India-Israel relations may not remain exclusive and may not be specifically Pakistan-centric in the long run. Israel, along with Pakistan and Turkey, was a key supporter of Azerbaijan’s recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, while Armenia has focused on Indian military supplies.
Since the beginning of the Gaza-Israel conflict, India has faced a different challenge.
First, there is a strong pro-Israel public opinion that is deeply rooted in the ideology of the ruling party and its supporters in India. Second, under the ten-year rule of Narendra Modi, India has decided to abandon its previous reticence and isolation in regional affairs and reprioritize its relations with the Gulf states.
How China comes into play
In an ongoing Competition for influence In the Gulf between the US and China, India has joined the Western-led efforts to support the security and stability of the Gulf states. This is an attempt to growing Chinese influence in the region. India is ready to offer strategic and security support to the region through newly enhanced relations. Normalization between Iran and Saudi Arabia mediated by China also helped India.
For India, Iran’s real strategic value lies not in the Gulf but in Central Asia and South Asia, where Iran supports India’s efforts in several connectivity projectsIn this sense, India’s progress with Israel has met with little or only muted resistance from Iran.
When it became known that India was supplying weapons and ammunition to Israel in the course of the military conflict, neither the Arab states nor Iran reacted. The delivery of ammunition, which has not yet been officially confirmed, is an important statement about the realignment of India’s relations in the Middle East.
In all official statements of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, it was stressed that Hamas’ actions on October 7, 2023 were acts of “terrorism”, a position shared by most Western governments and by their Gulf allies, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
India had previously welcomed the Abraham Accords, a Donald Trump-era initiative aimed at reshaping the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict outside of UN resolutions. However, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Qatar and Iran refused to jump on the bandwagon of the so-called new peace process.
The crisis shapes the future
The supply of ammunition to Israel could give India more support in Western capitals. However, the Arab-Israeli crisis continues to determine the future balance of power in the Middle East, especially against the Western countries and their Gulf allies.
Saudi Arabia is responding more cautiously and sensitively to the crisis because its domestic politics are more vulnerable to widespread resentment and unrest if it is perceived to be supporting Israel at the expense of a Palestinian state.
Iran, with its regional ambitions, enjoys broad support in Lebanon, Yemen and parts of the Gulf states. Whether or not Arab states accept Iran’s role in the Arab-Israeli crisis, it remains an influential actor whose support is crucial to maintaining any peace mechanism.
The brief military confrontation between Iran and Israel has raised concerns among European powers that they could lose influence in the region if the United States continues to ignore Palestinian demands.
Egypt, on the other hand, is the biggest loser in the crisis, despite having supported Israel for decades. Egypt is also concerned about alternative routes offered by the India-Middle East Economic CorridorThe Israeli plans dig a new canal between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea via the occupied Gaza Strip do not get along well with Egypt. For this reason, Egypt must protect Hamas, despite its disgust for Hamas’s ideological patron. the Muslim Brotherhood.
India is looking for opportunities for arms exports as the Modi government focuses on building a robust defence industry. However, selling ammunition to Israel during a war presents arms exports as a political statement.
However, India’s pursuit of a regional strategy must be consistent with the realities of the region in which it is located. India’s geopolitics will therefore be tested less in the Atlantic than in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf.
Regional actors have little confidence in US leadership and are looking for a new Security architecturethat is less dependent on the US and Europe and is ready to resolve regional crises. In the post-Gaza war period, regional powers such as Egypt, Iran, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia could actively seek Russian and Chinese involvement in the region. India must therefore be ready for broader regional engagement beyond bilateral immediacies.
Originally published under Creative Commons from 360° information™.
