Israel and Saudi Arabia want to continue normalization despite Gaza war
Normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia has become a central issue during the war between Israel and Hamas. Despite the great benefits that normalization brings to Israel, the current government is unable – and apparently unwilling – to take the initiative. In other words, an open process leading to a formal agreement that would bring about normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia does not seem to be in sight.
Nevertheless, journalist Barak Ravid revealed last month that IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi secretly met with senior figures from the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in Bahrain in mid-June under the auspices of the US Central Command (CENTCOM).
CENTCOM is a unified combat command of the U.S. military responsible for operations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, and plays a critical role in coordinating the military and security efforts of U.S. allies. Such a meeting, especially with the participation of a Saudi representative, is also a form of normalization. So what exactly is going on?
Normalization has many faces. The term is used in many different contexts and can be confusing. In the context of international relations, its use is most often associated with the establishment of diplomatic relations, sometimes after a conflict.
In Israel, “normalization” has become a code word for a “warm” peace with other countries – in contrast to the situation between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Jordan, where there are diplomatic relations and a “cold” peace, but no “normalization.”
In contrast, the term “normalization” (“tatbi” in Arabic) has a negative connotation in the Arab world, which is why the term “normal relations” is often preferred there.
So “normalization” should reflect several levels of relations. The first is functional formal normalization. This model involves cooperation in defense and intelligence work, and occasionally on economic issues. This type of normalization is based mainly on the existence of common interests and enemies, and takes place mainly behind the scenes, although it may also include public statements that result from the existence of diplomatic relations.
The cooperation takes place between officials at the royal court, the President’s office, the military, the intelligence services and the relevant ministries. This is the model for Israel’s relations with Egypt and Jordan.
The second model is unofficial normalization, characterized by bilateral – mostly secret – relations without the establishment of diplomatic relations. This is the situation in which Israel found itself for many years after its independence, until the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the Oslo Accords and the Abraham Accords.
The third model is that of legitimate normalization, characterized by cooperation not only at the governmental level but also between civil societies. Cooperation takes place openly and publicly, although sometimes covertly. This is the model of Israel’s relations with the Abraham Accords states – Morocco, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.
Why do we need a formal agreement?
The secret meeting in Bahrain raises an important question: If Israel benefits from military and intelligence cooperation during the war, despite being demonized for it in the Arab world, what need is there for a formal agreement with Saudi Arabia? Especially if Israel must in return agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state or take concrete steps toward that end.
There are several answers to this question: First, without real progress on the Palestinian issue, Israel risks returning to its previous status in the Middle East: that of a mistress with whom it conducts deals behind the scenes but without publicly acknowledging these transactions.
Israel’s decision-makers had no choice but to accept this status because the rulers of the Arab states feared for their lives and legitimacy. Without a formal commitment, such relationships are fragile and unstable, at the mercy of circumstances, interests and the consequences of their own exposure.
Second, Israel’s ability to cooperate economically with Arab states depends on the existence of a cordial, legitimate peace. The relations that have developed with the Abraham Accords countries are an example of this. The development of meaningful diplomatic and economic relations is only possible when there is openness.
For example, the Negev Forum, which was established to counter Iranian efforts to acquire military nuclear capabilities, held its first (and so far last) meeting in March 2022. Representatives from Israel, the United States, Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates were present; Jordan and the Palestinian Authority were also invited.
Trade with the UAE had reached around $3 billion before October 7. In addition, according to the Abraham Accords Report, bilateral trade between Israel and the UAE amounted to $1.39 billion in the first five months of 2024, an increase of 8% compared to the first five months of 2023.
There was also a smaller increase in trade volume between Israel and Morocco, Egypt and Bahrain. There was a decrease (17%) with Jordan, while Turkey announced a complete trade ban. However, figures for this are not yet available.
Such economic cooperation with Saudi Arabia can only take place if diplomatic relations are established; the economic opportunities with Saudi Arabia are much greater. There is also the possibility of realising President Joe Biden’s proposed economic corridor from India via Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean and Europe – an ambitious infrastructure project that would connect India to Europe via the Middle East.
Third, Israel is already becoming a pariah state on the international stage. Moreover, there is a risk that further escalation could even damage secret cooperation with states in the region. An end to the war, combined with a regional process towards the Saudis, would stop or even reverse this process and could expand the circle of countries normalizing their relations with Israel.
Finally, it is in Israel’s interest to offer a vision for a solution to the Palestinian question, since all attempts to circumvent this problem have failed.
The fact that the normalization of relations with moderate Arab countries continues quietly during the war is an important sign of the strong interests behind this alliance.
The author teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim – the Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policy.
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